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The Uses and Limits of
Statistical Analysis in
Measuring Economic Discrimination
Glen G. Cain 
University of Wisconsin
This paper begins with a brief discussion of the basic concepts of 
economic discrimination. In the second part, two case studies of ethnic 
discrimination from American history illustrate the uses and limits of 
statistical analysis. (The detailed evidence of discrimination against these 
groups is presented in the appendix.) The next part deals with current 
analyses of economic discrimination, and a summary concludes that 
evidence based on statistical analysis is necessary but not sufficient for 
establishing the presence of economic discrimination. It must be sup 
ported by historical and institutional evidence and interpreted within 
a theoretical framework.
Background Ideas
Economic discrimination is rooted in the practical matter of an in 
equity; usually an outcome in which equally productive people receive, 
on average, different rewards for their efforts. It is useful to distinguish 
economic discrimination, when referring to the economy as a whole, 
from labor market discrimination. Discrimination in the labor market 
may be represented by the example of equally productive groups receiv 
ing unequal earnings. In fact, the inequality in earnings is usually a result
15
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of unequal access to the better-paying jobs and will show up as in 
equality in occupational attainment.
The focus on monetary rewards is indisputably narrow and leads to 
certain anomalies. For example, a finding of equal pay leads to a ver 
dict of no labor market discrimination, but the finding may, and prob 
ably does, coexist with plenty of labor market discrimination in the or 
dinary use of the term. This seeming paradox can be resolved with a 
simple example. Assume that 10 percent of the workers are a minority 
group, that no laws bar discrimination, and that 50 percent of the 
employers discriminate against the minority by paying them less than 
majority members. All that is needed for the economic verdict of "no 
discrimination" is a sufficient number of employers who will hire the 
minority workers on a nondiscriminatory basis, and here the propor 
tion of nondiscriminating employers is relatively large. Examples of 
legal discrimination could be exposed if minority workers applied for 
jobs from discriminating employers, but the minority applicants would 
quickly shift to the employers who do not discriminate and end up receiv 
ing equal pay. 1
The economist's conventional criterion of equal pay even has the em 
barrassing property of constituting evidence for no discrimination under 
conditions of complete segregation. The Supreme Court has rejected 
the doctrine of "separate but equal," but the customary analysis in 
economics accepts the doctrine. Despite this awkward property, I will 
focus on income and pay differences between groups as the indicator 
of economic discrimination. In defense, all I will say is that the money 
measure is important in its own right, and it does tend to be associated 
with other measures of discrimination such as segregation by residence 
or schooling or occupation.
Problems in measuring economic discrimination are revealed by con 
sidering its three essential components: (1) the productive capacity of 
people, which is difficult to measure; (2) an opportunity structure fac 
ing the people, which is even more difficult to measure; and (3) the 
outcomes in the form of income and earnings, which are relatively well 
measured. The economist's method is to observe the outcomes, com 
pare these for people who are assumed to be of the same productive
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capacity, and then infer whether the opportunity structure reveals 
discrimination.
Some examples will illustrate when the worker's opportunity struc 
ture implies or does not imply discrimination. Recent immigrants who 
are unable to speak English and who are less productive for that reason 
will face restricted employment opportunities. Language facility may 
well be a justifiable requirement for hiring, but what about the require 
ment that the worker be a citizen? For long periods in our history, oc 
cupational licensing in some states required citizenship for dentists, 
engineers, master plumbers, and barbers. 2 A barrier based on citizen 
ship is arguably not only discrimination but tends to injure some ethnic 
groups more than others. In this century Asian immigrants to the United 
States were for a generation barred from citizenship in some states, 
notably California.
For another example, assume that workers in a particular ethnic group 
are untrained and have lower earnings. Their lower earnings suggest, 
but only suggest, that they are being discriminated against, but just where 
the barrier to training is located is often difficult to determine. Does 
the barrier rest with employers, with trade unions, with the educational 
system, with the workers' upbringing as children? Thus, these workers 
appear to face some type of discrimination in their economic oppor 
tunities, but it may not be labor market discrimination.
The above discussion involves wages and individual workers. The 
worker is the unit of analysis. I now turn to economic discrimination 
involving inequality in family income. The family is the unit of analysis. 
Family income is a fundamental measure of economic well-being and 
is more comprehensive than wage earnings. Moreover, examining in 
come and the family may help us understand the opportunities and pro 
ductive capacities of the person. Again, let me illustrate these points 
with examples.
A mother of young children may be working at a part-time job at 
a low wage, but her husband's earnings may be high enough to offer 
her the option of working less in the market than someone who must 
rely only on her own earnings and who works full time at a higher wage. 
The mother's low wage is not compelling evidence for labor market
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discrimination, because she may have high wage opportunities that match 
her productive capacity, but she does not choose these job opportunities 
because they require a full-time commitment. Another possible reason 
for the mother's low wage is that her housework tasks may reduce her 
productive capacity in the paid labor market because she does not have 
as much time or energy for market work as someone with less 
housework.
In this example, the mother's family context is assumed to be causal 
to her job and wage outcomes. Now consider an example when causa 
tion runs in the other direction. Assume that discrimination in the labor 
market imposes low earnings on a young person or on a mother with 
young children, and this person has to move in or stay with a larger 
household of other family members to take advantage of the pooling 
of resources and the economies of scale in living arrangements. Com 
parisons of household or family incomes are likely to be more equal 
than individual incomes, and the family comparisons can hide situa 
tions of economic discrimination.
To illustrate, young black men are less likely than young white men 
to live apart from their immediate family. 3 One reason they continue 
to live at home is that fewer young black men have good paying jobs. 
Therefore, they are less able to afford either to live alone or to marry 
and set up their own households. Table 1 shows, with a hypothetical 
example, how these living arrangements can understate the true gap 
between black and white family incomes.
The original family unit is assumed to consist of three persons the 
parents and a 22-year-old daughter or son. The black-to-white ratio of 
the family income of these original units is .75, derived from an average 
family income of $36,000 for blacks and $48,000 for whites. We do 
not observe these original family units, however; instead we observe 
living arrangements in which more 22-year-old whites live apart from 
their parents than do the 22-year-old blacks. To sharpen the comparison, 
assume that 50 percent of the young whites and 25 percent of the young 
blacks live apart from their parents. The observed family incomes show 
.90 as the black-to-white ratio of family incomes $28,800 for black 
families and $32,000 for whites.
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The simple point of this table is that the gap between black and white 
income is understated by the comparison of family incomes. A second 
and more profound point is that the family unit itself, which is a basic 
unit for income comparisons, is affected by the labor market outcomes 
and, therefore, affected by discrimination. Discrimination is a cause 
of the living arrangements of the families. This contrasts with the ex 
ample of mothers of young children, where the family unit had a causal 
effect on the labor market outcomes. Causation can run both ways, and 
one's measure of economic discrimination can be either over- or 
understated if this is not taken into account.
Two practical conclusions follow from the above examples. (1) The 
wage of the married woman with young children overstated labor market 
discrimination for her. Recall, also, that her household income show 
ed no disadvantaged outcome. (2) Labor market discrimination against 
black youth was correctly measured by their lower wages, but economic 
discrimination was understated by the comparison of black and white 
household incomes. These conclusions depend on the particular cir 
cumstances of my examples. Later I discuss how the opposite conclu 
sions might emerge from further analyses of these cases.
Measuring Discrimination Between Groups 
in a Historical Setting
Assume that we adopt the following statistical procedure to measure 
economic discrimination, if any, against a given ethnic group, using 
all other native-born whites as the comparison group. First, we classify 
the families according to the age and rural/urban residence of the primary 
earner; then we compare the average family income and average per 
capita income of the two ethnic groups across these classifications. 
Disparities in income are initial evidence of economic discrimination. 
To keep matters relatively simple, let us assume that the number of 
earners per family and family size are approximately the same in the 
two groups and that those in the ethnic group are all born in the United 
States. These steps are illustrated with hypothetical numbers in panel A 
of table 2.
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Table 2
Family Income Comparisons by Ethnic Group 
(Hypothetical Example)
Age

















Another step in the investigation is to subdivide the family groups 
according to the educational attainment of the primary earner, and then 
compare incomes within each educational category. If the same income 
disparities persist, we may view this as stronger evidence of economic 
discrimination in general and of labor market discrimination in particular. 
If, however, this statistical control for educational attainment, along 
with the controls for age and rural/urban residence, do not show in 
come differences, then we have two conventional interpretations. (Note 
that panel B of table 2 shows almost no difference in the family incomes 
of the ethnic group relative to the comparison group of native whites.) 
One interpretation is that the ethnic group's lower educational attainment
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is the source for their lower incomes, and their lower education reflects 
social disadvantages that accrued to the ethnic group before they reached 
adulthood. This view can be interpreted as exonerating the labor market, 
and employers in particular, from blame for the discrimination.
A second and contrary interpretation is that labor market discrimina 
tion is a cause of less education among members of the ethnic group 
because the market does not sufficiently reward them for additional 
schooling. Which of these two interpretations is correct is a challeng 
ing question. In the case studies that follow, data limitations prevent 
me from including education in my tabulations.
I would like to carry out the procedure outlined above for two ethnic 
groups, Irish-Americans and Japanese-Americans, for two years, 1900 
for the Irish and 1940 for the Japanese, using the decennial census. If 
the historians I have read are correct in their descriptions of the economic 
discrimination that these groups suffered in American history, then the 
economic statistics from these particular periods should show this.
The 1900 decennial census offers no data on income and earnings, 
and the 1940 census does not give earnings data for Japanese-Americans. 
These two censuses do, however, provide limited information about 
occupational attainment. I use these occupational data to support the 
proposition that a comparison of incomes in 1900 and in 1940 would 
show economic discrimination against, respectively, Irish-Americans 
and Japanese-Americans.
In 1900 the number of descendants of Irish immigrants was large 
enough to permit reliable statistics on the occupational attainments of 
those who were born in the United States. Also, within-group marriage 
was so prevalent that defining who was Irish is relatively unambiguous. 
Finally, as noted above in referring to the research of historians, it is 
likely that the Irish-Americans faced discrimination in the labor market 
during the period around 1900.
The occupational attainment of second generation Irish-American men 
in 1900 is compared to the attainments of all white men and of second- 
generation white men. 4 The group of all whites is composed of three 
ancestry subgroups: (1) 23 percent who were foreign born; (2) 20 per-
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cent who were second-generation Americans, that is, sons of foreign- 
born parents; and (3) 57 percent who were third- or higher-generation 
Americans, called native whites. 5 As a comparison group for evaluating 
the economic attainment of the second-generation Irish, all white men 
probably represent a relatively low standard of economic attainment. 
Consider that the 23 percent who are foreign born include many who 
could not speak English and some who were illiterate. Even the Irish- 
Americans who were born in Ireland were all English-speaking, and 
virtually all were literate. 6
My source for the occupational statistics from the 1900 census is 
E. P. Hutchinson, cited in footnote 5. The occupational categories are 
not well suited for measuring economic status, but I select certain oc 
cupations that should be unambiguous indicators of high or low attain 
ment. For one comparison, independent farmers along with five white- 
collar occupations (mainly professionals, agents, bookkeepers, mer 
chants, and salesmen) designate high occupational attainment. This 
assumes that the farmer occupation, which excludes farm laborers, 
represented higher economic status than most urban jobs in 1900. Three 
laborer occupations (mainly servants and waiters, other laborers in the 
service industry, and workers in the low-paying textile industry) 
designate low occupational attainment.
The 1900 census reported that 33 percent of all white men in the labor 
force were farmers or were in the five white-collar occupations, com 
pared to 24 percent among the second-generation Irish-Americans. 
Restricting the comparison to the urban labor force, 18 percent of all 
white men were in the five white-collar occupations compared to 15 
percent of the second-generation Irish. The three laborer occupations 
contained 18 percent of all white men and 23 percent of the second- 
generation Irish.
The comparison between second-generation Irish-American men and 
all second-generation white men gives similar but weaker findings, based 
mainly on the sharp contrast of representation in the low occupations. 
Only 14 percent of the second-generation whites were in the three low 
occupations, compared to 23 percent of the second-generation Irish. 
The two second-generation groups had similar percentages in farming 
and in the five white-collar occupations.
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The statistics in the above two paragraphs show a lag in the occupa 
tional attainment, and presumably in the incomes, of the second- 
generation Irish compared with other white Americans. (Further details 
and citations for these comparisons are given in appendix.)
The article on the Irish in the Harvard Encyclopedia of American 
Ethnic Groups gives a more pessimistic picture of the occupational at 
tainments of Irish-Americans. Patrick J. Blessing states that the Irish 
"were the only immigrant group whose occupational mobility during 
the late 19th century appeared almost as small as that of American 
blacks. . . . Their . . . record of movement up the occupational scale 
[was] dismal." 7 Although the occupational statistics from the 1900 census 
do not seem to me to justify this judgment, which may have referred 
to the Irish experience in Boston, I conclude that the statistical analysis 
supports the verdict of discrimination against Irish-Americans at this 
period in our history.
In 1940 nearly all the Japanese-Americans in the United States lived 
in the four western states of Arizona, California, Oregon, and 
Washington, with about 85 percent in California. The first generation 
had immigrated to the United States between 1890 and 1920. By 1940, 
almost two-thirds of the Japanese-Americans were born in the United 
States. There is abundant evidence that they faced severe social and 
legal discrimination, especially in California. Again, however, statistical 
evidence on how this discrimination affected their incomes and earn 
ings in 1940 is not directly available. Instead, I compare the occupa 
tions of second-generation Japanese-American men in the four western 
states with the occupations of all white men in California.
The occupations in 1940 are defined in modern terms, permitting a 
rough ranking by skill, although there are the customary distinctions 
between the white-collar occupation "clerical and sales" and the blue- 
collar occupation "craftsmen" where a ranking according to skill is 
uncertain. To measure the occupational attainment for the two groups, 
white men and second-generation Japanese-American men, I calculate 
average earnings for each of the two groups as follows. First, the me 
dian wage and salary earnings of each occupation is assigned to that 
occupation as a cardinal measure of its rank. There are 11 occupational
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categories, with professionals ranked highest and domestic servants rank 
ed lowest according to the earnings measure. Second, the percentage 
of each ethnic group in the occupation is multiplied by the occupation's 
median earnings, and the sum of these products gives an average earn 
ings for each ethnic group, although for the Japanese-Americans the 
average uses the occupational earnings of all the workers, who are 95 
percent white.
The ratio of this dollar-valued occupational attainment of Japanese- 
Americans to that of all whites is .92, implying a moderate lag in the 
attainments of Japanese-Americans. The ratio is probably upwardly bias 
ed. The method assumes that the earnings of Japanese-Americans and 
whites are the same within an occupation. Another source of bias is 
that second-generation Japanese-Americans had more education than 
whites in 1940, indicating that a control for educational attainment would 
show a lower ratio than .92. (The details of the above calculations and 
arguments are given in appendix.)
Let us assume, then, that a comparison of incomes in 1940 would 
reflect these findings about occupational differences between whites and 
second-generation Japanese-Americans. We may conclude, therefore, 
that the statistical analysis again supports a verdict of discrimination.
If we carry out income and occupational comparisons for the same 
two ethnic groups in 1970 and 1980, however, we find that the Irish- 
and Japanese-Americans have higher income and higher occupational 
and education attainment than other white Americans. This claim is 
stronger and clearer for Japanese-Americans, who have sharply higher 
family or per capita incomes than comparable native white Americans.
In Table 3, two comparisons are shown for family income. 8 For 
married-couple families the income of Japanese-Americans is 47 per 
cent higher than that of non-Hispanic whites; 26 percent higher if we 
look at just the primary earner's income. Not shown is a more technical 
analysis in which the incomes are standardized for age, education, marital 
status, and region of residency of the primary earner. With these 
characteristics taken into account there remains an 8 percent advantage 
in favor of Japanese-Americans. The last part of the table shows higher 
occupational attainments of Japanese-Americans.
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Table 3
Income and Occupational Attainment of American-Born Japanese 
and Non-Hispanic White Americans, 1980
Japanese- Non-Hispanic Ratio 
Americans White J/W
Average income of married- 
couple families $41,700 $28,300 1.47
Average income of married- 
couple families excluding 
income of family members 
other than the primary earner $26,900 $21,300 1.26
Occupations: Percentage in
(a) Professional, technical,
sales and administrative 54% 44% 1.23
(b) Operators, fabricators,
laborers, unemployed 13% 25% .52
SOURCE Harriet Orcutt Duleep, "The Economic Status of Americans of Asian Descent An 
Exploratory Investigation," U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Clearinghouse Publication 95, 
October 1988, pp. 35, 70, 73.
The evidence for higher incomes of Irish-Americans is not so strong, 
and the amount of their advantage is not so large. By 1970 the family 
incomes of men who reported Irish ancestry were about 5 percent above 
that of other white families. 9 Also, 48 percent of the men were in white- 
collar occupations, compared to 43 percent of other white men. One 
problem in measurement here is that Irish ancestry is defined by both 
parents being Irish. But by 1970, intermarriage between Irish-Americans 
and persons of other ancestry was common, so there is a selection of 
those who are recorded as Irish that lends an unknown bias to the in 
come and occupation comparisons.
One reason why the economic success of Irish-Americans in over 
coming discrimination is understated during this century is that 
discrimination was mainly against the Catholic Irish, and today the in 
comes and educational attainments of Irish Catholics are greater than 
for the Irish as a whole. 10
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We now have a puzzle, or maybe the right word is dilemma. If we 
accepted the 1900 and 1940 statistical evidence as supporting a verdict 
of discrimination against these two ethnic groups, then how should we 
interpret the 1970 and 1980 evidence? Does the latter imply discrimina 
tion in favor of Irish- and Japanese-Americans in contemporary America? 
Was there reverse discrimination in 1970 and 1980? If we dismiss this 
interpretation, should we then call into question our verdicts of 
discrimination in 1900 and 1940? Our investigatory procedures should 
be consistent. I believe, and this is my principal theme, that consisten 
cy is achieved by supplementing the statistical evidence with institu 
tional and historical evidence and with theoretical analysis. Indeed, my 
preference is to consider statistics as supplementary to the institutional- 
theoretical analysis.
The limitations of space and of my knowledge about the history of 
ethnic groups in America prevent an extensive discussion about how 
we should interpret the potentially inconsistent evidence presented above. 
The case of Japanese-Americans, however, appears to offer a straightfor 
ward reconciliation in the light of several well-known historical facts.
I claim that the statistical evidence supports the verdict of discrimina 
tion in 1940 and a verdict of no "reverse discrimination" in 1980. The 
reasons for the conclusion about 1940 are easiest. The record in the 
United States of legal and social persecution of Japanese immigrants 
and their offspring is astounding and appalling, culminating in the ef 
fective robbery of much of their land and wealth in 1942 when almost 
all Japanese-Americans were imprisoned in concentration camps. 11 Their 
lower incomes in 1940 reflect, as we see with subsequent evidence, 
discriminatory barriers rather than voluntary choices or any innate in 
capacity for economic success. 12
The explanation for their economic success since the end of World 
War II, shown by the income statistics for 1980, is not so easy. They 
have benefited by living in the most prosperous part of the United States, 
the West Coast, especially California. Also, there were, apparently, 
two strong selective forces at work on the Japanese-American popula 
tion. One is that the Japanese government selected the immigrants who 
went to the United States, beginning around 1890 and continuing until 
1920 or so. 13
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A second selective factor is that about 50 percent of the immigrants 
returned to Japan. 14 A natural inference is that the most successful stayed 
in the United States, and supporting testimony is given by Dorothy 
Swaine Thomas: "At the time of the Immigration Commission's in 
vestigations in 1908-1909, a majority of all classes [of the Japanese- 
Americans] interviewed either expected to return to Japan or were 
undecided about their future place of residence. The proportions in 
dicating that they had decided to become permanent residents of the 
United States were, however, highest among those who had 'succeed 
ed in rising from the ranks of the laboring classes.' " 15
We could, of course, appeal to various theories about the special work 
ethic and efficiency of the Japanese people to explain their economic 
achievements. In the case of the Japanese-Americans, however, these 
theories are not needed.
Fortunately, today we have data and tools of analysis that permit us 
to use both statistical and institutional-theoretical methods to analyze 
discrimination. Unfortunately, both methods are inherently imprecise, 
and reasonable people can disagree about the uses and interpretations 
of the evidence. I turn next to the current use of statistical evidence 
to measure labor market discrimination.
Statistical Models of Wage Discrimination
One of the earliest econometric studies to measure labor market 
discrimination against women was by Henry Sanborn and based on data 
from the 1950 census. Sanborn concluded that the wages of women were 
only moderately lower than those of men of the same region of residence, 
age, education, and occupation. 16 In 1973, a study by James D. Gwartney 
and Richard Stroup based on the 1960 and 1970 censuses found a sizable 
gender wage gap and extensive discrimination against women workers. 17
The different conclusions had nothing to do with the different years 
for the data sources. Instead, there are reasons for believing that the 
first study understated, and the second study overstated, labor market 
discrimination defined as unequal pay for the same productive
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capacities. The early study by Sanborn compared the wages of men and 
women in the same occupation, but because barriers to occupational 
entry are the most important form of labor market discrimination, this 
study surely understated it. A diagram of this model is shown in the 
first row of figure 1. By controlling for occupation in the statistical 
analysis, the researcher may be said to have "overcontrolled."
The models shown in figure 1 are deliberately simplified and are in 
tended to serve pedagogic purposes. They should not be viewed as 
representing the precise models used in the research literature I cite. 
With this qualification in mind, let us interpret Model I. Arrows denote 
causal paths. The right-side column headed "Outcomes" is self- 
explanatory, except for the important distinction between Model I, where 
only the wage is listed, and the other models, which treat occupation 
as another outcome that measures labor market success or failure. The 
conventional economic proposition that workers' wages are determin 
ed by their productivity is represented in column 3 (which is the sec 
ond of two columns under the heading "Intervening Variables"). A 
distinction is made between "productivity" in Model I, which is 
associated with the occupational skills of the worker, and "productive 
capacity," which determines, among other things, the worker's ability 
to enter various occupations. Once workers are in a particular occupa 
tion, their productivity may be enhanced by on-the-job training specific 
to that occupation.
The first column lists variables or traits of workers that may sometimes 
be assumed to be exogenous to the workings of the labor market. In 
the case of education, the assumption I adopt for convenience in Models 
I-III is that education is determined before the person enters the labor 
market and is unaffected by the operation of the labor market.
Model II in figure 1 describes the assumptions behind the 1973 study 
by Gwartney and Stroup that showed a large gender wage gap. The 1973 
study, however, did not allow for the difference between men and women 
in their years of experience in the labor market a gap which is related to 
the two careers, home and market, of many women. Without control 
ling for labor market experience, the observed lower average wage for 
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Later studies of the gender gap in wages allowed for the effects of 
the woman's previous employment experience either indirectly, by in 
cluding a fertility variable, or with a variable that directly measured 
the woman's previous years of labor market experience. 18 (See Model 
III in figure 1.) The gender gap in wages was much smaller in these 
studies. In my view, however, accounting for women's dual careers 
by statistical methods is an intractable problem in measuring labor market 
discrimination. Let me try to explain my view.
Recall the two sources of complexity caused by women's dual careers: 
first, that their choice of a less demanding job may be voluntary, perhaps 
as a consequence of their total family income; second, that the housework 
demands on their time and energy reduce their productive capacity in 
the paid labor market. These interpretations rationalize statistical 
strategies that include the following sorts of control variables when com 
paring women's and men's wages: full- or part-time work, years of 
experience in the paid labor market, numbers and ages of children, and 
marital status.
These control variables are usually interpreted to be explanations for 
the lag in women's wages that was otherwise attributed to labor market 
discrimination. This conclusion, however, may be challenged with an 
alternative interpretation that is based on the mutual causation between 
women's wages and the variables measuring their productivity. In this 
model (IV in figure 1), the restricted opportunities for women in the 
labor market that are attributable to discrimination are causal to their 
concentration on housework at the expense of market work. Statistical 
analysis can measure associations, but it cannot determine causation, 
at least not without a supporting theoretical rationalization.
This theoretical point about mutual causation may be explained without 
mentioning labor market discrimination. During recent decades, employ 
ment opportunities in the labor market have improved for women, and 
women have postponed their age of first marriage, had fewer children, 
and increased their rates of marital breakup. But what is cause, and 
what is effect? Was the decision to have fewer children independent 
of what was occurring in the labor market, and did increased market 
work by women then follow the decline in the birth rate? Or were the
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improved wage and job opportunities in the labor market causal to the 
decision to have fewer children? Economists have not been successful 
in identifying and quantifying the causal forces in these events. It is 
even more difficult to determine the additional causal role of discrimina 
tion in the labor market in these outcomes.
Summary
I am pessimistic about the power of statistical methods to determine 
and measure economic discrimination. We are not sure what variables 
should be used as control variables in the analysis. If relevant causal 
variables are omitted, the model "undercontrols" and, therefore, 
overstates economic discrimination. If, however, the control variables 
are themselves effects of labor market discrimination, then they should 
not be included in the model; this is the problem of "overcontrolling," 
which leads to an understatement of economic discrimination.
These statements are expressions of humility but not of despair. We 
can take a lesson from the historical studies, such as those alluded to 
above concerning Irish-Americans and Japanese-Americans. We need 
a theoretical framework supported by knowledge about the institutional 
and historical factors. In the modern context of assessing discrimina 
tion by employers and labor unions, we need to study the histories of 
the firms and unions to try to determine motivations and intentions. 
Statistical methods are indispensable in the task of measuring labor 
market discrimination, but they are still only one component of the 
analysis.
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Appendix
The Evidence for Economic Discrimination 
Against Irish- and Japanese-Americans in 1900 and 1940
In the text of this paper I assumed the following hypothetical proposition. 
If we had for 1900 and 1940 the type of economic data that we have had since, 
say, 1960, we would be able to show economic discrimination against Irish- 
Americans in 1900 and against Japanese-Americans in 1940 by conventional 
methods of economic research. The evidence mentioned in the text to support 
this proposition is admittedly meager. I doubt that the necessary data exist 
from these earlier years for applying conventional methods. This appendix 
discusses in more detail the evidence that is available. First, a theoretical point.
The Economic Theory of Labor Market Discrimination
The point was made in the text that merely documenting examples of 
employer discrimination against a minority group is not sufficient to indicate 
that the incomes or earnings of the minority group are lower than those of 
the majority group for workers of the same productive capacity. The documen 
tation is necessary for a verdict of economic discrimination, because it pro 
vides the historical and institutional evidence for how discrimination occur 
red. Statistical evidence showing lower earnings of the minority group is also 
necessary, however.
In the case of Irish-Americans at the turn of this century, for example, it 
is not enough to refer to the legacy of the infamous signs, "No Irish Need 
Apply." Knowing that some, even many, employers discriminated against the 
Irish does not tell us that the employers who did not were too few to enable 
Irish workers to earn a wage equal to that of other workers with their produc 
tive capacity.
In the hypothetical example of the text, where minority workers were 10 
percent of the workforce, and half of the employers did and half did not 
discriminate against the minority group, the claim was that competitive forces 
would secure pay for the minority workers in accordance with their produc 
tive capacity. The reason is that the same competitive forces that tend to equate 
the wage and productivity of majority workers would accomplish this for the 
minority workers. In other words, we should expect that the labor demand 
for minority workers by the 50 percent of employers who do not discriminate
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will provide enough bidding to ensure the same competitive solution for the 
minority group.
It is important to note that a large percentage of employers, relative to the 
percentage that the minority group constitutes, is not necessary to achieve a 
nondiscriminatory outcome. The argument runs as follows. Assume that only 
a few employers do not discriminate against the minority group. They will 
hire the minority workers because, unlike the discriminating employers, they 
suffer no nonpecuniary disutility from employing minority workers. At the 
outset, the nondiscriminating employers have no incentive to pay the minority 
workers any more than their market wage, which, by assumption, is less than 
the prevailing wage paid to workers in the majority group. By employing the 
equally productive but lower-paid minority workers, the nondiscriminating 
employers will make extra profits, and, to repeat a point, they suffer no disutility 
from employing the minority workers. The nondiscriminating employers will 
expand production in response to their extra profits, and this increases the de 
mand for and wages of minority workers.
The discriminating employers, who are losing their share of the market out 
put and losing their minority workers, will be forced to raise the wages of 
the minority workers if they want to keep them. In any case, the bidding for 
the labor of minority workers by nondiscriminating employers will continue 
to raise the wages of the minority workers until their wage equals that of the 
majority workers. Only at this point will excess profits disappear, permitting 
an equilibrium allocation of the share of output among the employers.
The point of this argument is that a comparison of earnings of minority and 
majority workers is needed to tell us whether the demand for labor by employers 
and consumers has produced a discriminatory outcome by the economist's 
definition. Recall, however, that some employers may be discriminating in 
the legal sense even though the market shows equality in earnings of the two 
groups.
Available Data on Irish-Americans
In view of the lack of data on incomes, how might we measure the economic 
status of Irish-Americans around the turn of the century? Several historical 
works have examined the occupational attainments of Irish-Americans in 
specific cities. Stephan Thernstrom, for example, reports relatively slow pro 
gress in occupational attainment by the Irish in Boston in the period around 
1900. 19 Andrew M. Greeley argues, however, that the historical record in 
Boston understates the occupational achievements of the Irish in the United 
States as a whole. 20
Measuring Economic Discrimination 135
Nationwide data on the occupations of the labor force from the Bureau of 
the Census seem to me to be our best source. From 1870 to 1900, the decen 
nial censuses reported the occupations of American workers classified by nativi 
ty and country of origin. This information is summarized in the book, cited 
in footnote 5, by E.P. Hutchinson. Unfortunately, the occupational classifica 
tions used for those censuses were based mainly on the workers' industry. 
Hutchinson commented that, "The primarily industrial basis of classification 
largely conceals whatever characteristics of skill or occupational status 
the ... [worker] may have had." 21 For example, in the 1900 census, the oc 
cupation of "iron and steel workers" includes unskilled and skilled workers.
Despite this problem, I am forced to use the 1900 occupational classifica 
tions instead of those in the 1910 census which do correspond to our current 
occupational classifications, because the 1910 census did not report the coun 
try of origin of the workers. In fact, the 1950 census is the next one to provide 
occupational data for workers according to their country of origin.
Although the 1900 occupational classifications do not, in general, permit 
a ranking by skill, there are several high-status and low-status occupations 
that clearly correspond with economic status. (Unless otherwise noted, the 
statistics that follow are from Hutchinson, pp. 172-175.) From 34 listed oc 
cupations from the 1900 census, I select the following five high-status occupa 
tions: (1) professional service, (2) agents, (3) bookkeepers and accountants, 
(4) merchants and dealers, and (5) salesmen. Occupations 2-5 are all contain 
ed in the "trade and transportation" industry. A large and relatively high- 
status occupation in 1900 is that of "farmers, planters, and overseers." 
Agricultural laborers are excluded, so this farm occupation probably has a 
higher status than the occupations of most urban workers. The low-status oc 
cupations that I selected are (1) servants and waiters, (2) other laborers, both 
from the "domestic and personal service" industry and (3) "textile mill 
operatives," selected because the textile industry was the lowest-paying 
manufacturing industry. 22
The occupational data from the 1900 census report whether the worker was 
born in Ireland, designating a first-generation Irish-American, or has foreign- 
born parents, designating a second-generation Irish-American. The Irish- 
American male workers are compared to all white male workers and to all 
second-generation white male workers. Table A. 1 summarizes the occupa 
tional statistics for these four groups. As noted in the text, in 1900 the all- 
worker group was composed of native workers (57 percent), foreign-born 
workers (23 percent), and second-generation foreign workers (20 percent).
The first evaluation of the occupational attainments of second-generation 
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shows that 24 percent of the second-generation Irish are in the farmer occupa 
tion and the five high-status (white-collar) occupations, and the corresponding 
figure for all whites is 33 percent. In the urban sector, 15 percent of the second- 
generation Irish are in the five high-status occupations and 23 percent are in 
the three low-status occupations. They compare unfavorably to the urban oc 
cupational attainments of all whites—18 percent in the five high-status occupa 
tions and 18 percent in the three low-status occupations.
Another comparison is between the second-generation Irish and the second- 
generation of all whites. The two groups had nearly the same percentage, 24 
and 25, respectively, in the combined farmer and five high-status occupations. 
In the urban sector, the occupations of the second-generation whites show 
somewhat higher attainments: 16 percent are in the five high-status occupa 
tions and only 14 percent are in the three low-status occupations, compared 
with 15 and 23 percent, respectively, for the second-generation Irish. The oc 
cupations of the first-generation Irish are considerably lower in all comparisons.
Available Data on Japanese-Americans
The 1940 census publications included a special report that gives 
demographic, educational, and occupational information, but no wage and 
salary data, for Japanese-Americans by country of birth. 23 The data cover the 
four western states, Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, where near 
ly all Japanese-Americans lived. The occupations are limited to 11 broad 
categories. Another problem is the small population of Japanese-Americans 
in 1940. Of the total of 127,000, 63 percent (80,000) were born in the United 
States, but 50,000 of the latter were less than 20 years old. As a result, there 
were only 15,000 second-generation Japanese-American workers in 1940. By 
contrast, there were over one million second-generation Irish-Americans in 
the labor force in 1900.
Adding to the difficulty of using the occupational data to evaluate the 
economic attainments of Japanese-Americans are the following problems:
(1) About 14 percent of the second-generation Japanese-American men 
and 5 percent of white men worked in agriculture. In 1940, unlike 1900, we 
cannot assume that farmers have higher incomes and economic status than most 
urban employees, so I exclude farmers from the occupational comparisons. 
Farm laborers are included because the low wages in this occupation are a 
clear indication of its low rank.
(2) Second-generation Japanese-American workers were, on average, 
much younger than white workers. Because occupational attainment depends on
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age, the occupational comparison needs to take account of the age differences 
in the two populations.
(3) Two occupations, "proprietors, managers, and officials (excluding 
farmers)" and "clerical, sales, and kindred workers" are likely to consist of 
jobs with lower status and lower workers' incomes among the second-generation 
Japanese-Americans than among white workers. Dorothy Swaine Thomas 
reports that, among the Japanese-Americans, "the personnel of so many enter 
prises consisted merely of an Issei [first-generation] 'entrepreneur' and his 
cooperating relatives. . . . Thus, the concentration of Nisei [second-generation] 
males at 'white-collar' levels . . . may be interpreted to mean that many of 
those classified in the proprietor/managerial group were in fact working in 
secondary positions in the larger, Issei-controlled enterprises, and that most 
of those classified in the clerical/sales category were, similarly, working for 
other Japanese. The few who had progressed beyond the limits of the Japanese 
business community were, for the most part, on low rungs of the urban oc 
cupational ladder and held the less desirable jobs." 24
Each of the problems listed above is addressed below in the comparisons 
of occupational attainments of Japanese-American and white workers.
The 1940 census included, for the first time, wage and salary information 
for the labor force, and this permits a quantitative economic scale for the oc 
cupations. (No data on occupational earnings are available for Japanese- 
Americans, however.) Given the concentration of Japanese-Americans in 
California (about 85 percent lived there), I use the occupations and wages of 
male workers in this state, 95 percent of whom were white, to construct a 
dollar value for the occupational attainments of the white and Japanese- 
American workers. Farmers are excluded, as noted above, and the median 
wage and salary earned by "professional workers" is assigned to the "pro 
prietors, managers, and officials" because income data from self-employment 
were not collected. 25
The occupational distributions and median earnings are shown in table A.2. 
An average earnings of white workers, excluding farmers, is calculated by 
multiplying the median earnings of each occupation by the percentage of white 
workers in the occupation and then summing the products. (To be precise, 
the median earnings are for workers who worked 12 months in 1939.) This 
average, shown in table A.2 to be $1,646, is a dollar measure of the occupa 
tional attainments of white workers.
The same method is used for evaluating the occupational attainments of 
second-generation Japanese-American workers. Their occupation percentages 
are multiplied by the white median earnings in each occupation. Thus, the dollar 
measure of the occupational attainments of Japanese-Americans assumes that
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Japanese-American and white workers in the same occupation received the 
same earnings. As shown in table A.2, the ratio of the dollar value of the 
Japanese-American occupational attainments to that of white workers is .87 
( = 1435/1646).
A second ratio of the two groups' occupational attainments uses the same 
earnings figures, but the occupational distribution of the Japanese-Americans 
who lived in the states of California and Washington in 1940 is adjusted to 
match the age distribution of the entire population of workers in these states. 
(About 90 percent of all Japanese-Americans lived in these two states in 1940, 
and about 95 percent of the entire population in the two states was white.) 
The age-adjusted occupational distribution of Japanese-Americans is taken from 
Thomas. 26 The method may be explained with a simple example.
Assume that 5 percent of the Japanese-Americans over 35 years of age, and 
2 percent of those under 35 years of age, were professionals, and that 80 per 
cent of the Japanese-American population of workers were under 35. Thus, 
their overall percentage professional is 2.6 percent ( = .8 X .02 + .2 X .05). 
Assume the white population has 50 percent of its labor force over 35. Then 
if the Japanese workers had the same age distribution as whites, 3.5 percent 
( = .5 X .02+ .5 X .05) would be in the professional occupation. The age- 
adjusted percentage of professionals for the Japanese-Americans is, therefore, 
3.5 percent.
The ratio of the dollar value of the Japanese-American occupations to that 
of the white workers, adjusting for age, is .97 ( = 1601/1646). The ratio without 
the age adjustment, .87, is biased down because of the younger ages of the 
second-generation Japanese-Americans. The ratio of .97 is biased up because 
of Thomas's point about the lower status and earnings of the large age-adjusted 
percentage (44.6) of Japanese-Americans in the proprietors and clerical/sales 
occupations, relative to the status and earnings of whites (28.6 percent) in these 
occupations. Both ratios are probably biased up because the calculation assumes 
the same median earnings of Japanese-Americans and whites within each oc 
cupation. Impressionistic evidence suggests that the earnings of Japanese- 
Americans were lower than those of whites. I simply averaged the two ratios 
and used .92 in the text to measure the lag in occupational attainment of 
Japanese-Americans.
Another reason why the occupational measure may understate discrimina 
tion against second-generation Japanese-Americans in 1940 is that it does not 
allow for their higher educational attainment relative to whites. Thomas reports 
an age-adjusted distribution of years of school completed for the second- 
generation Japanese-Americans who were 25 years of age or older. 27 Her data 
show that the median years of school completed in 1940 was 11.2 for the 
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The educational advantage of the Japanese-Americans, therefore, did not 
translate into an occupational advantage. This leads to the observation by 
Thomas that among the Nisei, "Engineers, accountants, teachers, and social 
workers found it almost impossible to practice the skills they learned." 28 Sup 
porting this point are the following amazing statistics reported in another study: 
among male Japanese-American college graduates who entered the labor force 
before 1942, only 10 percent went into professional jobs. In the 1950s, by 
contrast, about 70 percent of Japanese-American college graduates entered pro 
fessional occupations. 29 All this supports the conclusion that second-generation 
Japanese-Americans faced considerable economic discrimination in the period 
around 1940.
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